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Chapter 1
MEANING AND VARIETIES
Give me your watch and I’ll tell you the time.
German view of collaboration[1]
The Nazis’ newspaper in Jersey, Insel Zeitung, was keen  to  publicise  the  fact  that  the
islanders were enthusiastic about the occupation and keen to be Germanised:
In the  course  of  a  band  concert  given  in  the  Royal  Square  and  largely
attended by children and young people, at a given moment,  the  bandmaster
attracted the attention of his juvenile audience by  calling  out  that  he  had  a
question to ask them. He then enquired, with an insinuating air,  if  they  liked
chocolate, requesting those who did to raise their right arms.  There  naturally
arose a forest of eager  arms.  That  was  the  moment  at  which  the  waiting
photographer pressed the button. The following  day  the  current  number  of
the Insel Zeiting contained a picture showing  young  Jersey  standing  at  the  Nazi
salute while, the caption stated, the band was playing  the  Horst  Wessel  Song,  or
some other patriotic air.[2]
Of course, some types of collaboration were bogus. Others, by contrast, were very
real.
    Governmental elites engaged in political collaboration with the  Reich.  Ordinary
women formed sexual relationships with  occupying  German  soldiers.  And  there
were  many  forms  of  ’improper’  behaviour  in  between  -  some  that  could   be
described  as  collaboration,   some   that   could   not,   and   some   that   nestled
somewhere in between. In time, collaboration enveloped huge chunks  of  Europe,
aided the Nazis in their quest to eradicate the Jewish community, and  since  1945
it has left an unpleasant legacy.
     But  what,  in  fundamental  terms,  did  collaboration  mean?  What   were   the
different  varieties?  And  how  have   historians   conceptualised   it?   These   are
important questions to dwell on before we start to explore the phenomenon in  any
greater  depth.  We  should  also  be  aware  that  collaboration,   as   a   historical
phenomenon, looks very different from different angles. In the  post-war  period,  it
has been very easy, and very natural, for historians and  commentators  to  talk  in
terms of ’black’ and ’white’ -  the  collaborators  were  the  ’baddies’,  the  resisters
were the ’goodies’. We know the outcome of the war, we are aware  of  the  horror
of the Hitler regime, and we can now come to some fairly definitive judgements.
    But, at the time, things were much more complex and difficult. Ordinary people
and governments had no idea how the war was going to develop and had few
clues about how their decisions and choices were going to be viewed, and judged,
in retrospect. This is a crucial point to make. Areas were greyer during the war,
and this needs to be acknowledged.
      According   to   the   Concise   Oxford   Dictionary,   to   collaborate   is    to    ’work
jointly…cooperate traitorously with the enemy.’ However, this standard definition requires
a lot of unpacking. Some political leaders who threw in their lot with Hitler, or were forced
to, genuinely believed that they could, indeed, ’work jointly’ with the Führer. This  was  an
illusion, and was proven to be so when new political arrangements and relationships - not
all identical - began to develop in the early years of the war, and then when they reached
’maturity’ towards the end of the conflict. The notion of ’partnership’ was  stillborn,  and  it
says a lot  about  the  mental  state  of  some  ’puppet’  leaders  -  those  individuals  who
headed pro-Hitler regimes across Europe - that they actually believed they could  engage
the Reich in genuinely ’joint’ ventures. What happened in reality  was  quite  the  reverse:
the Germans exploited the ’partner’ states and  trampled  all  over  their  independence  -
both  political  and  economic.  Michael  Burleigh  reveals  that  the  Führer  had  difficulty
pronouncing the word,  ’Kollaboration’.  This  was  highly  symbolic  because  he  did  not
actually conceive of collaboration in the same way that others  conceived  of  it.  For  him,
’domination’ was the key word. This is an important preliminary point to make.
    Moving on, to what extent, and in  what  ways,  did  politicians  and  other  figures,
’cooperate traitorously with the enemy’? Clearly, this is a matter of interpretation.  Only  a
minority of  people  collaborated  as  self-confessed  ’traitors’.  Some  intellectuals,  some
informers, did so, but they were imbued  with  the  most  warped  of  ideas  and  ideology.
Most people did not ’cooperate traitorously’, but rather dealt with the  occupiers  because
they had to and because there was no  alternative.  They  were  not  ’born  collaborators’;
they were  just  ordinary  folk  who  had  to  develop  some  kind  of  survival  mechanism,
however risky and questionable  in  ethical  terms.  This  is  why  collaboration  is  such  a
fascinating theme. It was like a spider’s web that eventually  trapped  significant  sections
of the population. Some were genuine collaborators, but a sizeable proportion were not.
We must distinguish between ’official’ and  ’unofficial’  histories  of  collaboration.  This
adds to the complexity of  the  subject.  Sweden,  Switzerland  and  Spain  were  officially
neutral powers, but  this  has  not  halted  the  flow  of  post-war  innuendo  regarding  the
behaviour of governments and ordinary people in these countries. In the Balkans, it is the
numbers game. Today, if you’re a loyal Croat, you would probably claim that the Ustashe-
run Independent State of Croatia (NDH) - Hitler’s puppet administration in Zagreb -  killed
’only’ tens of thousands of Serbs between 1941 and 1944;  if  you’re  a  Serb,  you  would
reckon the figure to be in the hundreds of thousands. Official history, unofficial history.
In France, the situation is  similar.  General  Charles  de  Gaulle,  the  man  who
came to personify  the  new  liberated  nation,  was  keen  to  foster  the  view  that
France was ’a nation of resisters’, even though he and  everyone  else  knew  that
this was not the case and that many  French  people  had  compromised  with  the
Germans in a variety of spheres - either  as  full-blown  collaborators  or  wait-and-
see ’accommodators’. Unashamedly, de Gaulle  was  trying  to  manipulate  public
opinion in an effort to stabilise and solidify the post-war political settlement.
Who collaborated with the Nazis and their proxies? There is no simple  answer  to  this
question. It was anybody and everybody - a genuine cross-section of the population. This
is a random sample: anti-Zionist Muslims in the Balkans and the Middle East; peasants in
Ukraine and Belorussia; right-wing zealots such as Ferenc Szálasi  in  Hungary;  workers
in various countries who were subject to ’labour transfers’; high-ranking  civil  servants  in
the Netherlands;  Norwegian  women  in  search  of  love  and  affection;  senior  Catholic
churchmen like Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in Croatia; learned French intellectuals. And
an ex-resistance fighter in Serbia called Colonel Dragoljub-Dra?a Mihailovi?. Phyllis Auty
says that the Germans met Mihailovi? at an inn near Valjevo and decided that they  could
use him, even though they didn’t trust him fully.[3] Yes,  collaboration  was  as  secretive,
sinister, dirty and amoral as this. Why  this  man  and  others  collaborated  is  a  complex
question - one that will be dealt with in full in Chapter 3.
I  ’NARROW’ AND ’BROAD’ DEFINITIONS
Gerhard Hirschfeld explains that, for the most part, collaboration  has  been  defined  and
interpreted (perhaps mistakenly) in  fairly  narrow  terms.  In  essence,  it  was  a  political
relationship between  victor  and  vanquished,  between  occupier  and  occupied.  It  was
exemplified best by the agreement reached by  Hitler  and  Marshal  Philippe  Pétain,  the
French head of state, at Montoire in October 1940.[4] Here were two leaders, both attired
(significantly)  in  military  uniform  and  both  committing  themselves  to  a  new  type  of
political ’alliance’. Philippe Burrin says that Pétain’s  speech  ’was  formulated  with  great
prudence: the government was "entering upon the path of collaboration" and this must  at
once be "sincere" and also "exclude any thought of aggression"’.[5]
According to Rab Bennett, the Marshal’s government was the only  one  in  Europe  to
adopt ’state collaboration’ as official policy.[6] In one sense, Pétain had no choice,  but  in
another, he genuinely believed that he was doing the right thing. Given  the  predicament
that France found herself in, he viewed collaboration as a most ’honourable’ path to  tred.
Hence his sincerity and pride at Montoire - symbolised by his military garb.
     In  one  sense,  Vichy  France  was  a  puppet  state;  in   another,   it   was   an
’independent’ government. After October 1940,  the  ramifications  of  her  position
were significant. As Rupert Butler argues, once the ’principle’ of collaboration  had
been conceded - and whether it meant dependence or independence in practice  -
Pétain was forced ’to keep going the extra mile’.[7] Some historians would argue that
Vichy’s policy towards the Jews - the measures enacted without German encouragement
- was the most compelling proof of this position. One  view  is  that  because  Pétain  was
willing to go ’the extra mile’, the terms of Germany’s occupation of his country  were  less
brutal, relatively speaking, than elsewhere.
    Other regimes, of course,  engaged  in  collaboration,  without  formalising  it  in
such a grand manner as Pétain did. In the early years of the war,  Mgr  Jozef  Tiso
in Slovakia,  Dr  Ante  Paveli?  in  Croatia,  Vidkun  Quisling  in  Norway  and  General
George Tsolakoglu in Greece all  took  on  the  role  of  puppet  leaders,  which  basically
meant that they were Hitler’s proxies in their respective states.  In  other  countries  -  like
the Netherlands and Denmark - Hitler exerted a considerable administrative and  political
influence, thanks in no small part to  the  pro-German  position  taken  up  by  some  local
officials. These individuals felt they were doing the right thing in working with  the  Führer,
but some would have a fight on their hands in trying to convince others of this fact.
     So  far,  we  have  conceived  of  collaboration  in  fairly  narrow   terms,   as   a
phenomenon  that  had  its  major  impact  in  politics  and   government.   This   is
understandable. It could  be  argued  that  it  was  in  the  corridors  of  power  that
collaboration was most visible and controversial. Gerhard Hirschfeld,  however,  is
keen to broaden out the definition, to give it more depth and meaning. In  1989  he
wrote: ’In the majority of cases, "collaboration" has  been  understood  to  describe
political and ideological co-operation between Nazi occupiers and Fascist or semi-
Fascist factions among the native population. Economic, social and cultural issues
are dealt with only peripherally or are largely left to specialised  studies.’[8]  As  will
become apparent in due course, the present study also seeks to analyse collaboration as
a broad, multi-faceted phenomenon rather than as something with stricter parameters.
Up until now, we have focused almost exclusively on collaboration at the ’top’  of  society.
However, in many states, the reality of the wartime  situation  was  that  ordinary  people,
groups and institutions, as well as political leaders and governments, had to wrestle  with
the ethical dilemma that could be summarised in the following question: to collaborate  or
not? Alternatively, they could take up a position somewhere in between.
    Ordinary people going about their normal everyday lives were forced to address
the most terrible of quandaries. To frequent café bars used by German soldiers, or
not? To form relationships, whether platonic or sexual, with representatives of  the
Nazi regime, or not? To trade with, and make money out of, the occupiers, or not?
    Likewise, across Europe, social groups  and  institutions  had  to  examine  their
collective consciences. The church: should it grant any  legitimacy  at  all  to  Hitler
and his puppet leaders? Trade unions:  should  they  simply  make  way  for  Nazi-
style industrial relations? The  press:  should  it  simply  tow  the  line  (or  put  less
kindly, ’sell out’) to  the  rigorous  censorship  regime  imposed  by  the  occupying
authorities? At the time, these were major dilemmas, and from the relative comfort
of the twenty-first century, with hindsight on our side, we should not diminish  their
scale and gravity. The end result was a  lot  of  ’grey’.  Only  a  minority  of  people
engaged in full-blown collaboration; only a minority  could  claim  to  have  avoided
any contact with the Germans.
     And what of national governments? Should they work with Hitler in  an  effort  to  ease
the burden of occupation (the notion of the ’shield’ -  protecting  their  country)  or  should
they go into exile and fight the fight from the safety of abroad (the notion of  the  ’sword’  -
attacking the Nazis)? This issue was of particular pertinence  in  France.  Pétain  made  a
virtue out of his decision to stay in  the  country  and  deal  with  the  occupiers,  while  de
Gaulle was keen to exploit the fact that he had left to resist. Both men  claimed  that  they
had done the ’courageous’ and ’patriotic’ thing; the reality of course was that, in a strange
and  ironic  way,  the  Marshal  and  the  General  needed  each  other.  In   Greece   and
Yugoslavia,  the  same  kind  of  situation   played   itself   out.   The   Germans   invaded,
occupation followed, the ’legitimate’ governments went into exile,  and  a  small  group  of
collaborators held the fort at home.
Another way to think about collaboration  is  to  consider  the  spheres  in  which
victor-vanquished relations developed. Politics: joint action in governmental affairs
and in foreign and military  policy,  not  forgetting  the  posturings  of  the  assorted
’Naziphiles’ around  Europe.  Society:  from  literature  to  sex.  Economics:  trade,
finance and labour transfers. And the Holocaust:  the  ultimate  in  organised  race
hate. All these areas will be examined in greater detail in Chapters 4-7.
    But, however much we try to understand  collaboration,  and  also  try  to  codify
and compartmentalise it, some examples of it almost  defied  the  laws  of  political
gravity.
Communists and collaboration
The Nazi-Soviet Pact, signed on 23 August 1939, is one of the most infamous  diplomatic
manoeuvres in modern history. Even though  it  was  signed  eight  days  before  German
forces invaded Poland (the event which marked the beginning of the Second World War),
it is a prime example of collaboration, or a very specific  kind  of  collaboration,  in  action.
The Pact, formally known as the Treaty of  Non-Aggression  Between  Germany  and  the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was signed on behalf of Germany by Ribbentrop and
on behalf  of  the  Soviets  by  Molotov.[9]  The  main  themes  of  the  treaty  were  clear:
cooperation, non-aggression and mutual guarantees. It created a  situation  in  which  the
USSR (a Communist state) and Germany (a fascist state)  agreed  not  to  make  war  on
each other. This,  for  most  observers,  was  tantamount  to  the  most  insidious  kind  of
collaboration. In essence it was a holding operation, a stalling tactic, a Machiavellian ploy
designed to serve the rather crude short-term interests of both sides. As such,  it  can  be
viewed as an example of ’pre-collaboration’, collaboration in advance of the term actually
being coined.
    Quite predictably, the Pact had tortuous consequences  for  Communist  parties
around Europe. In France, the Parti Communiste Français (PCF)  was  flummoxed
and bemused. Its political reputation was built upon  its  anti-fascist  militancy,  yet
here was the Soviet leadership - the ’wise men’ in Moscow - getting into  bed  with
Hitler. For many, the manoeuvre was almost beyond comprehension.
     In  Norway,  the  situation  was  not  dissimilar.  Between  1939  and  1941,  the
Norwegian  Communist  Party  (NKP)   displayed   a   genuine   affection   for   the
occupiers and kow-towed to them willingly, with very little interest in  the  ethics  or
morality of  what  it  was  doing.  Eric  Lee  takes  up  the  story:  ’…the  small  and
declining NKP hailed the pact as a masterpiece of Soviet diplomacy…Recognising
that  a  New  Order  was  emerging  in  Europe,  with  Germany  at  its  centre,  the
Norwegian Stalinists were making the case that it was in the best  interests  of  the
workers to stay at their jobs,  to  cease  fighting,  and  to  link  Norway’s  economic
fortunes to those of greater Germany…The Communists called  for  a  conciliatory
approach toward the German authorities.’[10]
This must have been a  difficult  period  for  the  Norwegian  Stalinists.  In  June  1941,
Germany invaded the USSR, thereby consigning the Pact to the dustbin  of  history.  This
was a grave and momentous event, but at least it freed  up  Communists  in  France  and
elsewhere to act in line with their instincts once again. By the  end  of  the  war,  the  PCF
was claiming that it alone  had  been  at  the  vanguard  of  the  French  Resistance  and,
likewise, that  the  liberation  of  the  country  was  due  almost  exclusively  to  its  efforts.
Likewise in Norway: ’The Communists were not involved in and could not be  involved  in
resistance activity before June 22, 1941, when Germany invaded the  Soviet  Union.  But
from that moment on, the Comintern ordered a one hundred  and  eighty  degree  turn  in
the party line. The "imperialist war" had suddenly become a "great patriotic war"…’[11]
Thus, in  France  and  Norway  -  and  elsewhere  -  we  witness  the  strange  sight  of
Communists collaborating with Hitler. It was a  short-term,  temporary  phenomenon,  but
intriguing nevertheless. In France, the process seemed to cause the PCF untold torment;
in Norway, if Lee’s account is to be believed,  it  caused  the  NKP  only  the  minimum  of
discomfort. The fact that Communist activists in both countries were  quick  to  execute  a
volte-face in June 1941 simply adds to the picture of collaboration as, in the most  part,  a
convenient, ideology-free position.
    During the war, even Tito,  the  great  Yugoslav  resistance  leader,  considered
collaborating with the Germans to gain ground politically. Nothing came of this, but
it does illustrate the crazy things that were going  through  people’s  heads  at  the
time.
Religious elites and collaboration
If high-ranking Communists had a case to answer, so too did senior  religious  figures.  In
the Balkans and the Middle East, Islam stands accused. Many ordinary Muslims  went  to
fight for Hitler, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj  Amin  al-Husseini,  forged  a  close
political alliance with him. As a man of  supposed  integrity,  Haj  Amin  might  have  been
expected to stand up to the Nazis,  but  he  saw  them  as  a  key  ally  in  his  anti-Zionist
crusade. For their part, the Germans welcomed his support:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Berlin, April 28, 1942
Your Eminence
[The Grossmufti of
Palestine Amin El Husseini]
In response to your letter and  to  the  accompanying  communication  of  His
Excellency, Prime Minister Raschid Ali El Gailani, and confirming the terms of
our conversation, I have the honour to inform you:
The German  Government  appreciates  fully  the  confidence  of  the  Arab
peoples in the Axis Powers in their aims and in their determination to conduct
the fight against the common enemy until  victory  is  achieved.  The  German
Government has the greatest understanding  for  the  national  aspirations  of
the Arab countries as have been  expressed  by  you  both  and  the  greatest
sympathy for the sufferings of your peoples under British oppression.
    I have therefore the honour to assure you, in complete agreement with  the
Italian Government, that the independence and freedom of the suffering Arab
countries presently subjected to British oppression, is also one of the aims  of
the German Government.
    Germany is consequently ready to give all  her  support  to  the  oppressed
Arab countries in their fight against  British  domination,  for  the  fulfilment  of
their national aim to independence and sovereignty and for the destruction  of
the Jewish National Home in Palestine.
     As  previously  agreed,  the  content  of  this  letter  should  be  maintained
absolutely secret until we decide otherwise.
     I  beg  your   Eminence   to   be   assured   of   my   highest   esteem   and
consideration.
(Signed) Ribbentrop[12]
This was  an  unusual  link-up  -  one  founded  on  opportunism  and  a  mutual
distrust of the Jews. Haj Amin did not represent a state, but as the Grand Mufti  he
was a significant figure in moral and political, as well as religious, terms.  His  links
with Hitler tell us that alliances were as much about common enemies as anything
else.
There is disturbing  evidence  linking  the  Catholic  Church  to  the  Nazi  regime.  The
accusation is that across Europe, the Church, or  elements  within  it,  condoned  Nazism
because it did not condemn it strongly enough. In some contexts, the value system of the
Church coalesced with that of the Nazi-backed  authorities; in others, individual priests or
orders helped to protect war criminals in the post-war years. In  Slovakia,  there  was  the
bizarre spectacle of a cleric - Tiso - heading up the  puppet  regime.  But  it  is  difficult  to
generalise: there was no one across-the-board response.
The issue of the Jewish Councils, and their  behaviour  during  the  wartime  period,  is
also of considerable interest. The Nazis  established  Councils  in  Germany  and  also  in
other countries. They were  representative  bodies,  staffed  by  members  of  the  Jewish
community. Hitler regarded them as ’intermediaries’ in the Final  Solution.  Clearly,  those
Jews who became involved in the work of the Councils did all they could  to  obstruct  the
Nazis in  their  policy  of  persecution,  but  simply  by  taking  up  an  ’official’  role  in  the
Holocaust, these people were leaving themselves open  to  criticism  and  condemnation.
They were placed in a tortuous situation and the  charge  that  was  eventually  thrown  at
them was grave: they aided and abetted the Nazis’ programme of genocide against  their
own.
There was also collaboration within the Reich. As Daniel Goldhagen makes plain  in
his path-breaking work, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, ordinary Germans invested a  lot  in
Nazism   and   played   their   part   in   making   the   regime    work,    sometimes    quite
enthusiastically.[13] Economic and military elites had an interest in accommodating Hitler
after  1933.  The  religious  authorities  also   found   themselves   in   a   quandary.   DG.
Williamson argues that their chief interest lay  in  maintaining  their  independence  rather
than opposing the Reich.[14] Of course, there were individual priests of all denominations
who executed heroic deeds  in  the  name  of  anti-Nazism,  but  church  leaders,  on  the
whole,  were  hamstrung.  Stephen  Lee  is  even   more   disparaging:   ’The   Protestant
Churches  were  prepared  to  welcome  the  arrival  of  the  Nazi  regime,  regarding   the
Weimar Republic as un-German and ungodly…The Catholic Church was  also  willing  to
collaborate with Hitler in 1933. The Centre Party, still a political arm  of  Catholicism,  had
supported Hitler’s Enabling Act (March 1933) in  return  for  certain  religious  guarantees
from the government.’[15]
     The conclusion must be that few religious groups and institutions  had  a  totally  clean
conscience.
Justifying collaboration
For those who engaged in collaboration, of whatever type, the key questions were  these:
how could they rationalise their behaviour and how could they justify it to themselves and
to the wider world? It was a big challenge, but strenuous attempts were made  to  square
the circle,  to  explain  what  many  commentators  considered  to  be  the  unexplainable.
There was a constant refrain: the circumstances of war and occupation had brought  with
them new and unpleasant dilemmas.
    Ordinary men and women in occupied countries claimed they couldn’t  help  but
acknowledge, and thus accept, the German presence. They were not  collaborating
as such; merely trying to ’survive’, ’get by’ and ’earn a living’. At times, it  was  difficult  for
these people to sound convincing. Was it not the writer Simone de Beauvoir  who  stated,
’In   Occupied   France   the   mere   fact   of   being    alive    implied    acquiescence    in
oppression’?[16] Of course, in an ideal world, all members of society would have stuck to
the straight and narrow, and kept their principles intact; but  the  situation  between  1939
and 1945 was not ideal, and attitudes and behaviour varied accordingly.
In  a  similar  manner,  civil  servants  such  as  Hans   Max   Hirschfeld   in   the
Netherlands implied that they had no alternative  but  to  work  with  their  German
masters. They were doing a job, filling a void, and - in their own  minds,  at  least  -
not compromising themselves too much by working with the Germans on a  purely
administrative level.
There  is  also  the  interesting  case  of   the   Ustashe   and   the   Chetniks   in
Yugoslavia. As the puppet government, the Ustashe ruled Croatia with an iron fist;
the Chetniks in Serbia also ended up collaborating with the  Germans.  Brian  Hall,
exploring the politics of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, says:
The Croats had  been  right  when  they  said  many  more  Serbs  were  now
openly   calling   themselves   Chetniks   than   there   were    Croats    calling
themselves   Ustashas.   But   although   Tito’s   post-war   government    had
demonised both of its former enemies, the Chetniks had had, on the whole, a
more understandable rationale for their actions. Whereas  the  Ustashas  had
been enthusiastic collaborators with the Nazis from  the  beginning,  and  had
begun the ethnic slaughter, the Chetniks, though anti-Croat - especially  after
what they considered the Croatian betrayal of their Yugoslavia - concentrated
at the beginning on  fighting  the  Germans.  However,  they  viewed  as  their
sacred mission the preservation of the Serb  nation,  so  when  the  Germans
started shooting fifty Serb peasants for every dead German, they pulled back
[and began to collaborate].[17]
It is as if there were ’good’ collaborators (the Chetniks - preserving Serb lives) and
’bad’ collaborators (the Ustashe - doing Hitler’s  dirty  work  with  vim  and  vigour).
This is another interesting perspective on the issue.
Hall goes  on  to  liken  the  collaboration  of  Mihailovi?’s  Chetniks  -  originally  a
resistance force -  to  the  collaboration  of  the  Danes.  He  says  there  was  a  common
philosophy: ’We will accomplish nothing by  fighting  so  powerful  an  enemy  except  our
own destruction.’[18] This was one  important  rationale  for  colluding  with  the  erstwhile
enemy (in  the  case  of  the  Chetniks  -  the  Germans  and  the  puppet  government  of
General Milan Nedi?).
Then there were political leaders like Pétain who  argued  that  by  collaborating
with Hitler on a governmental level,  they  were  in  fact  ’shielding’  their  countries
from the worst  excesses  of  Nazism,  and  thus  should  be  admired  rather  than
castigated.
    The case of General Tsolakoglu in Greece is pertinent. He  surrendered  to  the
Germans in  April  1941  and  thereafter  ’proclaimed  his  readiness  to  serve  the
"Führer of the German people"; a government that he headed, he assured the Germans,
would be supported by all the  senior  generals  of  the  Greek  army.’  And  in  a  manner
reminiscent of Marshal Pétain in France, he began his first public proclamation as  leader
with the words: ’We are known to you as soldiers and patriots’.[19]
     Thus, here were two men who had ’sacrificed themselves’ to their  respective  nations
at a time of national disaster. There was gentle irony in the fact that two military men  had
emerged as ’saviour figures’ in the aftermath of military  defeat  and  humiliation,  but  not
unexpectedly, the blame was shifted rather adroitly to the politicians of the 1930s,  whose
policies and politics  had  been  misguided,  and  who  had  ’failed’  in  their  own  primary
duties.
     Gerhard  Hirschfeld,  however,  ridicules  the  type  of  thinking  that   high-level
collaborators, like Tsolakoglu and Pétain, engaged in,  and  the  justifications  they
attempted to put forward. He says that collaboration  did  not  moderate  suffering,
but actually increased it.[20] As examples of this, Vichy’s contribution to the  Holocaust
and its  commitment  to  sending  French  workers  to  Nazi  Germany  is  cited,  and  this
evidence tends to validate the ’extra mile’ thesis mentioned earlier.
    At the same time, however, we must recognise  that  some  political  leaders  all
too easily pigeon-holed as collaborators did engage in ’spoiling tactics’. Tiso, the man
who Hitler regarded as his puppet in Slovakia, had a corporatist-clerical  agenda  that  he
wished to implement regardless of the Nazis’ plans for his country. As such, in  power  he
proved  to  be  anything  but  a  soft  touch.  Rather,  he  was  difficult  to  deal   with   and
independent in his thinking.
     In  France,  Pierre  Laval  -  Pétain’s  chief  minister  -  prided   himself   on   his
awkwardness. Throughout the years of occupation, he was quite open in  the  way
that  he  talked  about  his   close   relationship   with   Otto   Abetz,   the   German
Ambassador to France. But, he did not want to go down in history as compliant  in
all spheres, and the testimonies of some of his colleagues do give the  impression
that he tried to obstruct the Germans. Henry Cado, director-general of the  French
police, has revealed what Laval said to  him  when  he  (Cado)  took  up  his  post:
’They will make demands; you must make demands’.[21]
     There were other types of collaborators who did  not  feel  the  need  to  apologise  for
their actions, or seek to justify them. The ’collaborationists’ - those  who  bought  into  the
ideology of Nazism - believed passionately in what they were doing, and were committed
to ’long-term and unlimited cooperation’.[22]  The  truth  is  that  these  people  wished  to
glorify their actions rather than excuse them. Perhaps the collaborationists were  the  real
collaborators.
II CONCEPTUALISING COLLABORATION
As might be expected given the contentiousness of collaboration as  a  political  strategy,
commentators have spent a lot of time and energy in conceptualising it. There  are  many
and  various  approaches  -  individual  writers  and  historians  have  their  own  personal
emphases - but there is also an element of agreement and consensus.
Butler focuses on Hitler’s allies in Eastern Europe. He labels  them  ’jackals’;  in
other words, leaders who assisted ’another’s immoral behaviour’. On  balance,  he
concludes that individuals like King Boris in Bulgaria and Admiral Miklós  Horthy  in
Hungary were ’moderates’ when compared to the fanatics  who  succeeded  them  in  the
later stages of the war.[23] In fact, there is an argument that says ’Hitler’s allies’ were not
collaborators at all. Rather, we should view them as what they  actually  were:  sovereign
states that were  neither  occupied  nor  subjugated  by  Hitler.  According  to  this  line  of
thinking, allies were allies, not collaborators.
According to Bennett, collaboration - proper collaboration, pursued  by  out-and-
out collaborators, not allies - was about the ’national interest’. During  the  wartime
period,  this  phrase  was   utilised   frequently   by   Quisling,   Pétain   and   other
collaborators. They believed that the ’national interest’ - a vague, abstract concept
at the best  of  times  -  gave  political  leaders  like  themselves  the  right  to  treat
individuals (especially Jews) as pawns in (what they viewed as) a complicated but
absorbing political game. Needless to  say,  policies  based  on  ’national  interest’
were almost totally devoid of moral and ethical considerations.
    For his part, Primo Levi, the Italian anti-fascist writer, has  talked  about  a  ’grey
zone’ in which collaboration took place - a notion that seems to  capture  the  ambiguities
and dilemmas implicit in  pro-German  behaviour.[24]  Here  we  have  to  remember  that
there were different varieties and degrees of  collaboration,  and  that  sometimes  it  was
simply a last resort or a ’front’. Nothing was ever cut and dried.  Peasants  and  members
of the intelligentsia in Ukraine engaged  in  military  collaboration,  but  claimed  that  they
were inspired by hatred of the Soviets rather than admiration for the  Nazis.  It  is  alleged
that the French  socialist,  François  Mitterrand,  worked  for  the  Vichy  regime;  yet  four
decades later he was elected his country’s president and served for two full terms  (1981-
95). How do we explain and rationalise these two very different scenarios?
    The  experience  of  occupation  forced  ’choices’  on  all  individuals,  argues  JF.
Sweets.[25] In his work, Istvan Deak explores the same theme. He says that for  ordinary
people there was a choice - accommodation or opposition -  but  for  some  communities,
like the Jews and gypsies, there was no choice.[26]  This  line  of  thinking  highlights  the
enormous moral consequences of Nazi hegemony. It impacted on the lives  of  everyone.
Men, women and children had to stand up and be counted. In  reality,  even  some  Jews
had  a  choice.  In  Germany,  the  Jewish  Councils  opted  to  cooperate  with  the   Nazi
authorities, to help in the round-up of Jews. For some observers, this was easily the most
disgusting form of collaboration.
    During the post-war period, collaboration became a political football. As  we  will
discover in Chapter 8, those on the left demonised it;  some  on  the  right  and  far
right sought to justify it.
Pluralising collaboration
As we have noted, collaboration is an umbrella term, and  as  such,  we  should  certainly
think of it in the plural rather than the singular. ’Unpacking’ the term,  however,  brings  its
own problems. How many sub-varieties of collaboration are there? Where are  they  quite
distinct and  where  do  they  merge?  What  commonalties  are  there?  At  a  push,  it  is
possible to delineate six main variants of collaboration.
’Heart-and-soul’ collaboration: This is closeness to Nazism on an ideological plane  -  not
doing anything  as  such,  just  believing  that  Hitler  and  Nazism  were  the  future.  This
equates to Werner Warmbrunn’s concept of ’voluntary’ collaboration  and  Werner  Rings’
notion of ’unconditional’ collaboration:
A  strange  and  motley  crew  rallied  beneath  the  banner  of   unconditional
collaboration: Marcel Déat, the socialist professor of  philosopher;  Kaminsky,
the Russian general; Fritz Clausen, the Danish doctor;  Vidkun  Quisling,  the
ex-staff officer and diplomat; Jacques Doriot, the ex-Comintern  official;  Léon
Degrelle, the Catholic fascist; and numerous others - a bwildering assortment
of characters, motives, ambitions, and political  bankrupts.  It  is  nonetheless
possible to generalise. 1. In no occupied country were extreme  collaborators
granted the recognition and authority  they  had  banked  on.  2.  Whether  as
supernumeraries, soldiers, aids to administration and repression,  or  political
pawns in the hands of the occupying power, they were always in the  minority
and always on  the  sidelines.  3.  Under  German  occupation,  their  average
support   amounted   to   no   more   than   2   percent    of    the    indigenous
population.[27]
In essence, this type of collaboration  is  about  conviction  and  belief,  genuine
collaboration perhaps. If we were to resort to a colloquialism, we would talk  about
a ’meeting of minds’.
    In the context of the Netherlands, Warmbrunn talks about ’collaboration with the
Germans  to  the  detriment  of  humanitarian  considerations   or   Dutch   national
interest, motivated by National Socialist convictions  or  by  a  desire  for  personal
gain.’ For him, this kind of  collaboration  is  akin  to  treason.[28]  In  the  context  of
France,  historians   now   distinguish   between   ’collaborationism’   (this   ’unconditional’
ideological closeness) and ’collaboration’ (working with the enemy on  a  purely  practical
and logistical level). It could be said that any phenomenon that gives birth to a new  piece
of terminology has to be taken seriously.
The ’shield’ philosophy: Bennett talks about collaborators  who  wanted  to  ’protect’  their
country and ’avert the worst’.[29] Others refer  to  ’neutral’  or  ’reasonable’  collaboration.
Rings uses the first term and Warmbrunn the second in trying to describe the  same  kind
of attitude - in effect, retaining a handle on local administration for the  ’greater  good’.  In
practice, this meant working faithfully with the occupiers and putting into effect all  routine
edicts  that  emanated  from  them.  The  Jews  who  served  on  Jewish  Councils  -   the
administrative bodies set up by the Nazis - believed in protecting their own  kith  and  kin.
They  weren’t  staffing  these  organisations  because  they  wanted   to   speed   up   the
Holocaust, but because they wanted to minimise it in whatever way possible.
Governments in Holland, Norway and Belgium all made a point  of  carrying  out
administrative duties, but not legislating.[30] This was the ’shield’ philosophy in action.
It could be argued that Hans Max Hirschfeld, a senior civil servant in the Netherlands  (he
held  the  post  of  secretary-general  for  economic   affairs),   personified   this   type   of
collaboration, or non-collaboration as it should  be  known  perhaps.  He  attracted  much
flak, but he always maintained that it was important for his country to carry on functioning
properly during the occupation. He argued that if he had a role to play in this, so be  it.  In
France, Pétain and Laval put great faith in the ’shield’ philosophy, but Gerhard Hirschfeld
is not convinced; he argues that France, more than any other country, actively  supported
the German war effort.[31]
’Conditional’  collaboration:  This  was  a  shrewd  strategy,  a  halfway   house   between
resistance and total collaboration: ’The conditional  collaborator  says:  "I  cooperate  with
the occupying power although I  endorse  only  some,  not  all,  of  the  National  Socialist
doctrines. Subject to that proviso, I am ready and eager to collaborate faithfully because I
wish to change the circumstances that dictate my attitude."’[32]
    Whether they were conscious of it  or  not,  many  ordinary  people  would  have
played the role of ’conditional collaborators’. Their instincts told them  to  obey  the
new authorities in place; their  consciences  told  them  that  the  new  rulers  were
illegitimate. This was the dilemma. They hoped that the liberation,  when  it  came,
would vindicate their pragmatic positioning vis-à-vis the occupying power.
     According  to  Rings,  there  were  many   excellent   examples   of   conditional
collaboration:  in  Norway,  where  ordinary  folk  followed  a  ’third  way’   between
resistance and collaboration; in Holland, where  the  Netherlands  Union  -  a  new
body - blended pro-German and  anti-German  sentiments;  and  in  Denmark  and
France, where the governments made it official policy. He also highlights the  case
of ’Red Army officials and Communist Party officials’ who engaged in this  specific
type of collaboration after they had been taken prisoner.[33]
’Tactical’ collaboration: This almost merged into  conditional  collaboration.  Bennett  calls
this  ’the  double  game’,  a  manipulative  and  duplicitous  tactic.  In   a   sense,   tactical
collaboration  was  about  out-bluffing  the  Germans.  The  strategy   was   used   in   the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and Denmark. John Wuorinen portrays the  Danish
attitude   as   intelligent:   ’Realistic   adaptation   to   existing   circumstances   called   for
collaboration. The five  years  of  the  occupation  offered  repeated  tests  of  the  Danes’
adaptability and capacity for defining the limits of their accommodation  of  the  Germans.
Much had to be yielded between 1940 and 1945, but a great deal was saved.’[34]
     Whether the Danes knew it or not, they were engaging in tactical collaboration.  When
Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, he was doing so as part of a strategy - even if
it backfired in the end. Likewise, when the Jewish  Councils  cooperated  with  the  Nazis,
they  were  making  a  calculation,  however  mistaken  and  ill-judged.  In  France,  René
Bousquet made his name as a minister in the pro-Nazi Vichy  government,  but  in  1949,
when he came before the High Court of Liberation Justice, he was given a light  sentence
because of the help  he  had  also  given  to  the  Resistance.  Thus,  as  a  ploy,  tactical
collaboration could be viewed as both cynical and smart. It was  one  of  the  many  ’grey’
zones  between the ’black’ and ’white’ of resistance and collaboration.[35]
’Submission…on the grounds of superior  force’:  This  type  of  collaboration  was  about
coming to terms with reality, about recognising outright  political  and  military  superiority.
Warmbrunn argues that this position was equivalent  to  ’accommodation’,  accepting  the
status quo, however unpleasant. In turn, Gerhard Hirschfeld  says  that  ’accommodation’
was a kind of staging-post on the road to collaboration proper.[36] He goes  on  to  argue
that one of the most accomplished exponents of ’accommodation’ was Dr Hendrik  Colijn,
a noted Dutch politician. After his country had been invaded by the Germans,  he  set  up
the Nederlandse  Unie  (Netherlands  Union),  a  body  that  envisaged  working  with  the
occupiers rather  than  instinctively  opposing  them.  Colijn’s  philosophy  was  based  on
realism and practicalities, and when it looked like Hitler might  win  the  war,  the  Union’s
recruitment figures started to increase.  We  could  also  cite  the  example  of  the  Dutch
Calvinist newspaper, De Standaard. It  adopted  a  policy  of  ’non-resistance’  during  the
war, and paid the price afterwards.[37]
This variant of collaboration links into the attitude  known  as  ’passive  acquiescence’.
This was the reality of the  wartime  experience  for  many  people,  and  is  one  that  the
French novelist, Simone de Beauvoir, articulated in extremely vivid terms.[38] Experience
was also to demonstrate that  some  civil  servants  and  some  newspaper  editors  were
susceptible to this kind of collaboration.
Attentisme: In reality, this  position  was  not  dissimilar  to  that  taken  up  by  Colijn,  the
Netherlands  Union  and   other   ’accommodators’.   In   the   early   years   of   the   war,
attentisme  was  probably  the  most  common  attitude  on  display.  Gerhard   Hirschfeld
defines it as ’a cautious waiting approach, a form of playing for time’.[39] As such,  it  has
little in common with ’full-blown’ collaboration.
A good  example  of  this  attitude  in  action  came  in  Belgium.  In  1940,  King
Leopold III capitulated to the Germans, and throughout the post-war years he was
ridiculed for his ’gutless wait-and-see policy’. As Els  Witte,  Jan  Craeybeckx  and
Alain Meynen have argued, those on the left had plenty to go  on:  ’They  criticised
the pre-war policy of neutrality…his visit to Hitler  in  Berchtesgaden,  the  frequent
and close contacts of his entourage with collaborating circles…the  deportation  of
the royal family ahead of the liberation, the fact that the king  had  not  condemned
the persecution of the Jews and the forced labour deportations in  public,  and  his
refusal to  back  the  resistance.’[40]  In  short,  the  monarch  was  over-cautious  and
unheroic in his wartime stance, and by 1951 the fall-out from his actions,  or  non-actions,
forced him to abdicate.
In summary, it would be accurate to say  that,  whatever  the  dictionary  definition  of  the
word, collaboration has been interpreted, at the time and since, in wildly differing  ways  -
from  an  ’honourable’  course  of  action  (Quisling,  Pétain)  to  a  callous,   sinister   and
Machiavellian operation (most historians  and  twenty-first  century  observers).  It  was  a
multifarious   phenomenon.   There   was   genuine   collaboration   but   also    forms    of
collaboration that weren’t really collaboration at all. In the end, the activity of collaboration
was subject to gradations (some individuals were executed for  their  wartime  behaviour;
others were simply let off).
    We could actually go further and  suggest  that  there  were  as  many  types  of
collaboration as there were individual collaborators. Everyone had their own,  very
personal way of ’doing business’. Haj Amin, the  Grand  Mufti  of  Jerusalem,  was
obsessed by the issue of the Jews;  Stalin  sought  a  diplomatic  breathing-space;
the ideological collaborators wished to make a statement of political  intent;  Dr  Colijn  of
the Netherlands Union and officials of the various  Jewish  Councils  were  determined  to
work alongside the Germans  in  an  effort  to  ’tone  down’  the  harshness  of  their  rule;
puppet leaders like Quisling and Paveli? wanted a taste of  power,  however  hollow  and
derivative. Many collaborators, many different types of collaboration.
     Now that we have explored  the  meaning,  or  meanings,  of  the  term,  it  is  time  we
moved on to the ’story’ of collaboration. What actually happened? When did collaboration
emerge as a discernible phenomenon? What were the main landmarks in its history?
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